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FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY





In a pair of recent articles, Brian Left ow and Eleonore Stump oﬀ er indepen-
dent, although similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Both 
believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can oﬀ er solutions to the kind 
of Leibniz’s Law problems that can seem to threaten the logical possibility 
of this traditional Christian doctrine. In this paper, I’ll have a look at their 
compositional account of the nature of God incarnate. In the end, I believe 
their position can be seen to have unacceptable philosophical and theological 
implications, and that is it inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s law problems that 
motivate it in the fi rst place.
Section I: Introduction
In a pair of recent articles, Brian Left ow and Eleonore Stump oﬀ er inde-
pendent, although strikingly similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the 
incarnation.1 Both believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can oﬀ er 
solutions to the kind of Leibniz’s Law problems that call into question the 
logical possibility of this traditional Christian doctrine. The Left ow and 
Stump account of the nature of God incarnate (which I dub “the composi-
tional account of the incarnation”) will be the focus of this paper. In the end, 
I believe their position can be seen to have unacceptable philosophical and 
theological implications. Furthermore, it is inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s 
law problems that motivate it in the fi rst place.
Section II: Troubles for the Incarnation
The doctrine of the incarnation states that Jesus Christ was fully God and 
fully human. But this can seem to be an impossible claim. For, plausibly, 
nothing created could be God. Yet anything that is human must surely 
be created. Therefore, a God-human would be both uncreated and cre-
ated. But it is impossible that a thing have a property and its logical 
complement. Therefore, it would seem, the doctrine of the incarnation is 
necessarily false.2
A traditional way of defending the doctrine against this and similar ob-
jections is to claim that God Incarnate has some properties “qua his divine 
nature” and some “qua his human nature.” By making use of reduplica-
tive sentences (i.e., sentences of the form “S qua N is P”), one att empts to 
insulate the properties so that there is in fact no logical inconsistency. The 
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idea is that even if there is a single subject of predication (as the tradition 
insists there is) the distinct natures can be used to separate the property 
ascriptions enough so that the logical diﬃ  culties are avoided.
However, this way of solving the inconsistency problem is apparently 
inadequate. For, it can be argued, even if it is only qua N that S is P and it is 
qua N* that S is not-P, as long as S indeed has both natures and “P” is univo-
cal in both att ributions, S will nevertheless be both P and not-P. In the words 
of Thomas V. Morris, the qua move serves only to “muddy the waters.”3
Enter Left ow and Stump. Inspired by Thomas Aquinas, they indepen-
dently argue that there is a way of understanding the metaphysics of the 
incarnation that blocks the inference from “S qua N is P” to “S is P.” It is to 
this that we will now turn our att ention. Because the accounts they oﬀ er 
are so similar, I will generally talk as though their positions are the same. 
When points of diﬀ erence do become important, I will make that clear.
Section III: A Compositional Christ
Traditional Christian theology proclaims that in becoming incarnate, God 
the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity, took on or assumed a human na-
ture. According to what I’ll call the “compositional account” (CA), God 
the Son became a human being by adding on a human body and a human 
mind,4 and by doing it in such a way that God the Son, the human body, 
and the human mind of Christ together compose the Incarnate God. 
‘Compose’ here is to be understood quite literally; the Incarnate God is 
a whole whose proper parts are the human body and human mind of 
Christ, and God the Son.
Yet this claim—that in addition to taking on a body, God the Son took 
on a human mind—brings with it a rather serious philosophical diﬃ  cul-
ty. For in the standard case (and, as seems likely, in every other case), a 
human body and mind combination composes a human person. So one 
might think that the human body and mind of Christ will compose a hu-
man person too. On the face of it, that’s no problem; aft er all, the tradition 
holds that Jesus Christ was a human person—although not only a human 
person. The problem, though, is that if the human body and mind of Jesus 
Christ compose a person on their own, then it looks as though we will have 
fallen into the heresy of Nestorianism, viz., that the incarnation was the 
joining of two distinct persons, one divine and one human. For before the 
particular body and mind of Jesus Christ existed, the person of God the 
Son existed. So if the human body and mind of God Incarnate compose a 
person on their own, then there are two persons in the incarnation—God 
the Son and the human Jesus Christ.
Left ow and Stump recognize this problem. In fact, Left ow spends con-
siderable eﬀ ort trying to show that the CA theorist has a good response. 
Left ow claims that the defender of CA will have to make a two-part reply. 
First, she should say that God the Son assumes the human body and mind 
before the pair has a chance to compose a distinct human person. That is, 
the assumption occurs at conception. So even if the particular body and 
mind that the Son assumes would have composed a distinct human person 
had they existed on their own, it doesn’t follow that they do when they are 
taken on by God the Son at the moment they come into existence.
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The second part of the CAer’s reply gets rather complicated. The bot-
tom line is that she must claim that it is coherent to suppose that the 
combination of the Son and the human body and mind compose only 
a single person, even though the human body and mind would have 
composed a person had come into existence on their own. To make this 
plausible, Left ow discusses Peter Geach’s famous example of Tibbles, the 
one-thousand-haired, mat-sitt ing cat. Tibbles is composed by a certain 
mass of feline tissue. Now, of course, Tibbles could lose a hair without her 
thereby ceasing to exist; so consider the proper part that Tibbles now has 
that consists of the entire mass of feline tissue minus one particular hair 
that we will name Hair1. Call this part of Tibbles “(Tibbles–Hair1).” Now 
if (Tibbles–Hair1) were to exist on its own (that is, the matt er that now 
composes Tibbles but without the matt er that constitutes Hair1), then it 
would compose a cat. (That we are committ ed to this can be seen by rec-
ognizing that removing Hair1 from Tibbles would still leave us with a 
cat.) But then why shouldn’t (Tibbles–Hair1) compose a cat even if it has 
one more hair stuck to it? It would seem that if (Tibbles–Hair1) would 
compose a cat on its own, then it will still compose a cat if it has one extra 
hair. So now it looks as though the mass of feline tissue sitt ing on the mat 
contains two cats, viz., Tibbles and (Tibbles–Hair1). But of course, if it 
contains two cats, then it contains thousands—one for every combination 
of hairs present on Tibbles. This is surely an unwelcome conclusion. A 
sensible metaphysics will maintain that there is a single cat on the mat.
Left ow suggests that one way to defend the single cat claim is to proﬀ er 
the thesis that no member of a natural kind can have a member of the same 
natural kind as a proper part. If this is right, then (Tibbles–Hair1) isn’t a cat 
since it is a proper part of Tibbles. The same holds for all the other would-
be cats that nearly spatially overlap Tibbles. Now if this move works for 
Tibbles, Left ow reasons, it can work in the case of the Incarnation. For, 
Left ow avers, persons are natural kinds. That means, then, that no person 
can have a person as a proper part. Left ow writes:
More generally, given a set of parts composing at time t a member of 
a natural kind (e.g., cat), no subset of that set composes at t a member 
of the same natural kind. Well, then: persons are a natural kind. So if 
at t S [the human soul], B [the human body] and the Son compose a 
person, no subset of {S, B, and the Son} does so.5
So if there is a divine person who exists prior to assuming the particular 
human body and mind of Christ, then the human body and mind can’t 
compose a person too. For if it could, then the human person would be 
a part of the person who is the compositional whole, and thus Left ow’s 
principle would be violated.6
Let me be more specifi c about what I mean by calling Left ow’s and 
Stump’s position a “compositional view” of the incarnation. Here’s 
Left ow’s formulation:
Perhaps the most formal, abstract thing one can say about the in-
carnation is this (following such as Aquinas): for the Son to become 
incarnate is at least for there to come to be a whole consisting of 
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certain parts. Let “the Son” name the Trinity’s second person and 
“Jesus Christ” name the whole consisting of the Son + B [the par-
ticular human body assumed by the Son] + S [the particular human 
soul/mind assumed by the Son]. Then for the incarnation to take 
place is for Jesus Christ to come to be, by the joining of the Son, S 
and B.7
Stump is equally explicit about the compositional nature of her view:
Because Christ is one and just one person, and a person is a sub-
stance of a particular sort, there is just [one] substance in Christ. That 
substance is composite. It includes a human soul and body and the 
divine nature. So Christ is one composite person.8
So both Left ow and Stump view the incarnation as the coming into exis-
tence of a composite consisting of God the Son and the human body and 
mind of Jesus Christ.
Section IV: Troubles with the Compositional View
Traditional Christian theology maintains that the Godhead is Trinitarian: 
three persons but one substance. Add to this the claim that one member of 
the Trinity is God the Son, and you get the conclusion that God the Son is a 
person. And his being a person is independent of his becoming incarnate. 
Indeed, since traditional Christian theology also teaches that creation is 
the free action of the Godhead, it follows that there are worlds at which 
God the Son is not incarnate but is yet a person.
The CA claims that God the Son is one part of the composite that is God 
Incarnate. For ease of reference, let’s refer to the person who is the Second 
Person of the Trinity and who would have existed whether or not there 
were ever an incarnation, “God the Son” (GS). Let’s refer to the composite 
that is composed by God the Son and the human body and mind of Christ 
“God Incarnate,” or “Jesus Christ” (JC).
We can now ask this question: is God the Son identical to God Incar-
nate? In fact, we can ask this question in a more traditional way. Since JC 
just is God Incarnate, we can pose our Christological question by asking if 
JC is identical to GS. The tradition clearly teaches “yes”: Jesus Christ and 
God the Son are identical; “they” are the same person. And herein is a sig-
nifi cant problem for the CA: it must, in the end, deny this. Recall that JC, is 
a composite consisting of GS, and the human body and mind assumed in 
the incarnation. So if GS is but a proper part of the individual who is Jesus 
Christ, then the friend of the CA is committ ed to saying that GS and JC 
are not identical. Their nonidentity brings with it one or the other of two 
unwelcome consequences: either there are two persons in the incarnation 
or the composite Christ is not a person.
Stump does consider the potential problem that the CA is committ ed to 
two persons, but what motivates her worry is the same thing that troubled 
Left ow: if a human body and mind are suﬃ  cient to compose a human 
“substance” (in Thomistic terms) and a human substance is a person, then 
it would appear that assuming a complete human nature means that GS 
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takes on a distinct human person. Receiving her cue from Aquinas, Stump 
responds by claiming that this is not so in the Incarnation “in virtue of 
being subsumed into the larger whole,” or because the human body and 
mind are “part of a larger composite.”9
Yet the problem as we are now considering it is not motivated by the 
worry that the human body and mind of JC will compose a distinct person 
on their own. Rather the problem here is that since JC is a composite that 
has GS as a proper part, JC and GS can’t be identical.10
Surprisingly, Left ow accepts this consequence. He thinks that GS is not 
identical with JC because the former is simple and the latt er a complex 
whole composed of the Son, and the human body plus human soul.11
This is, however, highly problematic. For, as previously noted, if JC 
and GS are not identical, then either Nestorianism is true and there are 
two persons in the incarnation, or God Incarnate—Jesus Christ—is not a 
person. To make matt ers worse, the fact that the CA is committ ed to JC’s 
not being a person falls out of what Left ow says earlier when he claims 
that no natural kind can have a member of that same natural kind as a 
proper part (recall the Tibbles discussion). But Left ow thinks that persons 
are natural kinds.12 So then GS can’t be a proper part of JC if JC is also a 
person. Thus, if GS is a person (and surely that is nonnegotiable) then 
either JC is not a person or GS isn’t part of JC.
But if JC is not a person, then there is no person who is God Incarnate. 
The doctrine of the incarnation is supposed to bring us comfort in the 
belief that God knows our condition because God the Son was one of us. 
The CA straightforwardly denies this. What it substitutes for a personal 
God Incarnate is an impersonal conglomerate.
Section V: Compositional Alternatives
The problem we are considering for the CA has been generated by the claim 
that JC is a compositional whole consisting of GS together with a human 
mind and body. Since a whole can never have itself as a proper part, GS can’t 
be identical to JC. This together with the assumption that GS is a person, en-
tails that either God Incarnate is a person distinct from GS (in which cases 
Nestorianism follows) or else God Incarnate is a impersonal conglomerate. 
But might there not be some way the friend of CA can tweak her theory so 
that she can hold the traditional Christological identity of GS and JC?
Section V.I First Alternative: Compositional God the Son
Yes, it seems that there is. Perhaps the defender of the CA can claim that 
I’ve misrepresented the situation. For although it is a necessary truth that 
a whole cannot have itself as a proper part, one and the same entity can 
be composed of {p1, p2, and p3} at t1 and yet be composed of {p1, p2, p3, 
and p4} at t2. Now let’s name the fi rst set S1 and the second set S2. S2 has 
S1 as a proper part, but, of course, S1 is not identical to S2. But if we can 
allow that an object can be composed of one extra part at t2 than it was 
composed of at t1, then we’ll be able to see that one and the same entity 
can have the set of all the parts that composed it at t1 as proper part at t2. 
Here’s an example: a tree grows a new branch; it now has all the parts that 
previously composed it together with a new part. The collection of older 
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parts then goes from composing the whole of the tree to composing only 
a proper part of the tree.
So maybe the CA can be salvaged by claiming this: at t1, GS is a simple, 
immaterial divine spirit. But at t2, GS assumes a human nature, taking 
on a particular human body and mind. GS now comes to have parts GS 
didn’t have before. That is, before the incarnation, GS just is the immate-
rial spirit. But once he becomes incarnate he takes on two more parts. So 
whereas the immaterial divine spirit was once all that composed GS, aft er 
the incarnation, GS came to be composed by GS + human body + human 
mind. Just as, for example, a tree can grow new branches so the Son can 
take on material parts.
Let’s think harder about cases in which an entity takes on or adds parts 
while maintaining its identity. To make our discussion at least a litt le more 
relevant to questions of the incarnation, let’s jett ison talk of trees and their 
branches and replace them with humans and their limbs. In particular, 
let’s consider the case of Torso. Torso is a human who, due to an unfor-
tunate interaction with a combine, has no arms or legs. Torso suﬀ ers no 
mental defects and will pass any reasonable test for personhood. We have 
no problem imagining that Torso could get artifi cial or donor limbs that 
would function as well as typical human limbs function. Furthermore, it is 
at least arguable that they then become genuine parts of her (more on this 
below). So here is a case of a person who takes on parts she formerly didn’t 
have and, at the end of the story, she is a composite that is a bit larger and 
compositionally more complex than she was formerly.
Notice that in both the case of GS and the case of Torso, it is possible 
that the individuals will come to lose the newer parts and return to their 
prior state. But this engenders no metaphysical impropriety. The newer 
parts were, ex hypothesi, nonessential parts of the original individual. Parts 
can be added and lost without the identity of their owner suﬀ ering.
Just how good is the analogy of Torso to the CA of God Incarnate? In 
order for the case to do its work, it must be clear that Torso now has her 
new limbs as parts. But as the case was described, that’s not obvious at all. 
Suppose that the limbs are artifi cial—human-made, non-biological pros-
thetic devices. It is plausible that no matt er how natural they look, and 
even how natural they feel to Torso, they are no more than well-att ached 
instruments. Aft er all, if we super-glued a pole with a spring-driven clamp 
on the far end to your hand, you would not have added a part. You’d 
have merely att ached a grabbing instrument to one of your parts (i.e., your 
hand). So as long as the prosthetic device is hooked onto the body (even if 
it is wired in), it will not be clear that the device actually becomes a part. 
Indeed, many would say that it is clear that it isn’t.
Yet we can add a further specifi cation of the case that can get around this 
diﬃ  culty. For consider the possibility of donor limbs. Suppose that limbs 
could be donated like some organs can. So Torso awaits the untimely death 
of someone who dies young and with healthy limbs intact. These limbs are 
removed and sown onto Torso in the same way they’d be sown onto her 
if her own limbs had been recently severed and reatt ached. Within weeks, 
Torso is walking, writing, and behaving as she did before her disfi guring 
accident. Her limbs not only function like her old limbs for the purposes 
of walking, writing, and other types of standard human behavior, but they 
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also “behave” in all other ways like natural limbs: the tissue is being kept 
alive and healthy by the circulation of blood, and the parts of the limbs are 
being regulated by the body just as Torso’s original arms and legs were.
There is litt le doubt that her new limbs are parts of Torso. There is 
no good reason to think that Torso has merely had att ached instruments 
that fall short of being genuine parts. The limbs are precisely of the same 
type and att ached in the same way as her original limbs, which were, of 
course, paradigmatic parts. Now if the fates are suﬃ  ciently cruel, Torso 
might survive losing these four parts again. And even before her nick-
name became appropriate, Torso existed. She then became de-limbed, 
then re-limbed, and de-limbed a second time. But it is Torso herself who 
survives these changes.
Now can we say something parallel regarding GS? Of course there is no 
talk here of GS’s initially having parts removed. But we can leave oﬀ  that 
fi rst step: GS exists as a simple, immaterial person. It will come in handy for 
us to refer to the simple, immaterial, divine spirit that originally composes 
GS as “GSS.” So in the fullness of time, for us humans and our salvation, GS 
takes on a human nature—that is adopts a concrete pair of human parts—a 
human soul and a body. Now composition is not identity; so we are not 
saying that GS becomes identical with this incarnate state (whatever that 
might mean). But GS now comes to be composed by it—that is by GSS, and 
the human body and mind of JC. And in the future, possibly, he will shed 
these human parts, and revert to being composed of simply GSS.
The advantage of this view over Left ow’s and Stump’s is clear: Nesto-
rianism is avoided and Jesus Christ is identical to God the Son. In taking 
on his human parts, GS becomes a human being (although, of course, not 
merely a human being)—the human being JC. So there is a single person in 
the incarnation and that person is identical with GS.
What are the problems with this defense of CA? Theologically, it runs 
into trouble with even a mild version of the doctrine of simplicity. On this 
view, GS is not identical with GSS since what composes GS when GS is 
incarnate is not simply GSS but is GSS together with the human body and 
mind. If GS comes to be partly composed of a human body and mind, then 
there just is no good metaphysical sense in which GS is simple. Of course, 
the divine nature remains simple, but the Second Person of the Trinity 
does not. Furthermore, GS will be partly material. These would seem to be 
most unwelcome theological consequences, at least for someone interested 
in defending the traditional view of the nature of God and of the Trinity.
Philosophically, the problem is a bit harder to see, but even more deci-
sive. It is part and parcel of this view that in virtue of taking on the human 
body and mind, GS comes to be composed partly of them. But in virtue of 
what does GS’s taking on human nature mean that the human body and 
soul literally become part of him? This gets us deep in to the metaphysics 
of the part/whole relation. So a full answer is undoubtedly beyond our 
grasp for the present purposes. But we might make some progress with 
another analogy. First, though, let’s note an important disanalogy between 
the case of GS/JC and that of Torso.
I’ve been assuming that Torso is a human being who is composed by 
the matt er in her body. That is, if we think that Torso is identical with a 
human animal, then the part of her that is her improper part just prior 
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to the att achment surgery is similar in kind to the parts that are being 
sown to her. Both consist of conglomerations of cells the make up and 
structure of which are consistent with human DNA. When the arms and 
legs get att ached, their microparts circulate with the circulating mass of 
microparts that had composed Torso prior to her surgery. Arguably, they 
become genuine parts (rather than mere instruments) because, aft er a 
time, they are fully integrated into matt er and activity of Torso’s other 
parts. It is because nothing like this happens with the mechanical grabber 
that it never succeeds in being more than a mere instrument of Torso’s.
But with GS and the “addition” of the human body and mind, things are 
rather diﬀ erent. Although GS might come to bear a intimate and unique 
relationship to these other entities, there is no possibility that the human 
body and mind will be incorporated into the life of GS in anything like the 
natural, organic (and I mean that metaphorically, at least primarily) way 
Torso’s new limbs are joined to her. Because GSS has no proper parts, there 
is no chance that the human parts will be integrated to it.
So then we must ask, in virtue of what do the human body and mind 
come to be parts of GS, as opposed to mere instruments or some other 
kind of entities related externally and instrumentally to GS? If we think 
of an analogy with a non-divine person, I think we’ll see that there is no 
way for this compositional relationship to be established. Suppose, for 
example, that there was a certain person, call him “Socrates,” who existed 
as a simple, immaterial spirit. Aft er a time, the powers that be decide that 
Socrates should become att ached to a body and spend some time in the 
shadowy world of matt er. So these powers imbed Socrates in a body. For 
a time, Socrates is able to use his body as a means to express himself, as a 
means for gathering information (via the senses), and as a means of loco-
motion. Eventually Socrates wears out his welcome in the material realm 
and is made to drink a potion that will release him from his body. My 
question is this: is it plausible to suppose that while he was embedded in 
the material realm, Socrates’ body was literally a part of Socrates, just as 
the new branches are literally a part of the tree or Torso’s limbs are liter-
ally a part of her?
I maintain that it is not. Socrates’ body is to Socrates very much as 
a mechanical grabber is to me.13 Just as I am able to use the grabber to 
accomplish some tasks I could not have done with out it, so Socrates is 
able to do some things that would be impossible for him to do disem-
bodied. But neither the grabber nor Socrates’ body can be incorporated 
into the very essence or nature of that which is using them. Since Socrates 
existed prior to his inhabiting a body, his essence or nature did too. Now 
I’m not claiming that only that which is essential to one is properly said to 
be a part of one (Torso’s case shows that’s wrong). I’m maintaining instead 
that parthood requires being integrated into the essence of that to which a 
thing is att ached as a part. My claim is that Toro’s limbs pass this test, but 
Socrates body doesn’t.
One might be concerned that accepting my account of part addition and 
its implications for Socrates has serious consequences for anthropological 
dualism. Does the fact (if it is one) that Socrates can’t come to have a physi-
cal part entail that dualism is false? No, it doesn’t. First, there are dualists 
(like Plato) who hold exactly the view I’ve described. That is, some dualists 
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are happy to say that the physical “part” of a human is an ersatz part; it 
is an instrument of the soul, or maybe even a prison, in which the soul is 
housed. Naturally, many Christians reject this view as, well, too Platonic. 
For these people there are other options that do not contradict what I have 
to say about the Socrates case. Socrates (as described in my case) was pre-
existent. So he can only have a physical part if it is possible that he takes it 
on subsequent to his coming into existence. However, if the dualist claims 
that the soul and body were created at the same time, then it isn’t clear at all 
that they can’t both be parts of Socrates. For in this case, the body needn’t be-
come integrated into the immaterial part because it has simply always been 
a part of who and what Socrates is. On this picture, Socrates is composed of 
a body and soul from the beginning of his existence. Socrates body is one 
of his two primary proper parts. Finally, if the dualist thinks that the mind 
is emergent and although numerically distinct, is nevertheless ontologically 
dependent on a functioning brain, then there is no problem with the claim 
that human person is a conjunction of the physical and mental. For in this 
case, the mind is surely integrated into the physical part of the person since 
it is the product of the causal activity of the brain. So my argument for the 
claim that the pre-existent, simple, immaterial Socrates cannot come to have 
a body as a literal part has no serious consequences for many varieties of 
anthropological dualism.
Although this isn’t the place to get into a full-scale discussion of the 
nature of parthood, I do want to briefl y consider another objection to what 
I’ve been arguing. I said that Socrates does not have his body as a part of 
him because parts must be integrated into the essence of that of which they 
are parts, and that there is simply no way for a body to be so integrated 
into a simple, immaterial soul. But one might think that this is a bad condi-
tion for parthood generally. Aft er all, it is unproblematic that a door is part 
of a car. But in what sense is the door integrated into the essence of the car? 
It is att ached via a pair of hinges. Can that count as proper integration? 
The answer is that it can. There is no reason to expect that the details of the 
ways in which parts come together to compose wholes will be the same 
for every type of object. It is plausible to think that the specifi c conditions 
for integration of parts into wholes for living organisms will be rather dif-
ferent from the conditions of composition for nonliving, artifactual mate-
rial objects. I suspect that being att ached by bolts and hinges might well 
be suﬃ  cient for being integrated to the essence of a car, given that a car 
just is a collection of parts so adhered. In short, what “integration into the 
essence” comes to will depend greatly on the type of entity in question.
Section V.II Second Alternative: Imbedded God the Son
There is, however, a possible position that doesn’t require that the human 
mind and body literally become part of GS. I’ll conclude this part of the 
paper by considering this option.
Perhaps GS’s taking on a human nature—that is a human mind and 
body—isn’t really much like taking on a part. So even though there was 
a time at which GS had no merely-instrumental-parts,14 he came to have 
some at the incarnation. So before the incarnation GS = GSS. And then, 
with identity being what it is, once the incarnation occurred we still have 
GS = GSS. The human nature is adopted by GS but that does not mean that 
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there is some new thing in addition to the simple, divine spirit to which 
GS is identical. Still, for us and our condition, he took on a human body 
and soul to use instrumentally. Like the att ached long-armed-metal grab-
ber, the human body and soul, though assumed by GS, are not part of him. 
Nor are they part of a whole that composes him. Rather, we might say that 
GS becomes in a way imbedded in the human mind and body he assumes.
So what are the implications of saying that these things are assumed 
by GS, although not as literal parts but only as instruments? Well, it can 
be reasonably maintained that even ersatz-parts that are assumed but not 
genuinely integrated into the essence of a thing can have drastic eﬀ ects 
on what the thing does and even, in a sense, what it is capable of. For 
example, suppose a politician decides that she wants to really know what 
the life of disabled Americans is like. She then makes the following com-
mitment: she’ll spend a month in a wheelchair followed by a month blind 
(but not in a wheelchair). If she is a person of genuine conviction, her 
commitments will limit not only what she in fact does, but also what she 
would do in various counterfactual circumstances. So in taking on these 
conditions, she not only restricts, and to an extent, diminishes her actions, 
but she also restricts the range of action that she will and would perform. 
Of course, she remains capable of standing even when in her wheelchair 
and of seeing when wearing her blindfold. So she gives up no genuine 
abilities, but she restricts her range of actual and counterfactual action 
and knowledge (one gives up some knowledge one would have had if one 
agrees to go blindfolded for a month).
So we might try to see the incarnation in a parallel fashion. Perhaps, to 
count as genuinely human, you have to have a genuinely human mind 
and body through which you act. Perhaps acting through this human 
mind and body entails that you lack the information of the divine mind, 
and lack the impeccable spirit of the divine being. This doesn’t mean you 
sin, of course, but only that you act from a spirit that is not impeccable. 
And while these limitations have counterfactual ramifi cations, they don’t 
amount to a literal abandoning of the powers one had in the fi rst place.
This model of the incarnation sees GS as taking on, or assuming, human 
nature with its incumbent limitations, but yet it doesn’t entail that JC is 
an impersonal conglomerate, or that GS is a composite person during the 
incarnation. Thus it has advantages over its more literally compositional 
cousins. Furthermore, none of the objections to the other various ways of 
altering the CA apply to it. The view, though, does have its diﬃ  culties. 
One might wonder, for instance, whether, on this view, God Incarnate 
was “fully human.” For the body and human mind of Jesus Christ do not 
only fail to compose a human being on their own, they are not even parts 
of the person who is God Incarnate. Be this as it may, the present position 
is not one to which Left ow and Stump can hitch their wagons. Recall that 
an important part of the motivation for the CA is that it be able to account 
for the whole’s having certain properties because those properties are had 
by its parts. In order for this gambit to work, the parts need to be real and 
not ersatz parts. So while it follows on the present view that GS has all 
the properties of GSS (since this position sees GS and GSS as identical), 
there is no similar pull for thinking that the properties had by the human 
mind and body of God Incarnate are properties of God the Son. To see 
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the full impact of this point, however, we must consider the issues of the 
next section.
Section VI: Why the Compositional View Doesn’t Help Much
Let’s put all these issues aside and assume that the Left ow/Stump version of 
the CA is unproblematic. At the beginning of this paper, we saw the work 
that Left ow and Stump have for the CA to do. They are led into their discus-
sions of the metaphysics of the incarnation as a means of answering philo-
sophical objections to this central Christian doctrine. They claim that the 
CA gives one the philosophical resources for answering charges of inconsis-
tency. In this section, I will argue that that Left ow and Stump have greatly 
overestimated the degree to which the CA is successful in this enterprise.
Before gett ing into the nitt y gritt y of this, I should point out that while 
I was able to treat Left ow and Stump as oﬀ ering the same general version 
of the CA, there are important diﬀ erences in how they use their common 
perspective to solve problems of purported logical inconsistency. Therefore, 
I’ll have to spend more time explicating the diﬀ erences in their perspectives 
in this section.
As I said earlier, Left ow and Stump believe that the CA can be used to 
avoid logical diﬃ  culties by explaining how reduplicative sentences (i.e., 
sentences with the form “S qua N is F”) can be used to show the consis-
tency of incarnational claims. For example, it would seem that because he 
is God, JC must be omnipotent; yet because he is human he must be a fi nite 
being of limited power and hence be not omnipotent. But how can he be 
both omnipotent and not omnipotent? Well, Left ow and Stump aver, the 
omnipotence is had qua JC’s divine nature and the power limitations are 
had qua JC’s human nature. Because the properties are had qua diﬀ erent 
natures, there is no contradiction in saying that JC is both omnipotent and 
not omnipotent.
That’s the basic idea. But how are we to understand what it is to have 
a property “qua” something? It is here that the CA is supposed to earn its 
keep. Stump writes;
This distinction [between a property a whole has in its own right and 
a property it has only in virtue of having a constituent part that has 
the property] gives us a helpful way to analyze qua locutions of the 
form x qua A is N. In such a locution, the property of being N is predi-
cated of x, but it is predicated of x just in virtue of the fact that x has a 
constituent C which has the property of being N in its own right.15
This line of thought can also be seen in Left ow’s paper. Left ow is particu-
larly interested in using the reduplicative sentences to show how JC can 
be both human and yet timeless. Writes Left ow:
If we allow talk of a timeless Son and temporal beings forming a 
whole, part/whole considerations can disarm well-known objections 
to moves in Christology. Wholes oft en have att ributes because their 
parts do. Apples are red because their skins are—that is, because their 
parts include red skins. . . . One can use the term ‘qua’ to indicate just 
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which parts give an item certain of its att ributes. Apples are red qua 
skinned, that is, because they include skins.
Christologists oft en say things like
(C) Christ died qua human but not qua divine.
I think the best reading of claims like (C) is mereological: we ought 
to read them as we just read my claims about apples. If (C) is true, 
I suggest, Christ did die: for a person including a human body and 
soul dies if his body dies and his soul is parted from it. What (C) 
asserts is that Christ died because his human part died, not because 
his divine part did.16
So Left ow and Stump agree on the basic reading of reduplicative sen-
tences. “S qua N is P” is to be understood as being equivalent to “S has a 
constituent part N and N is P.”
Doesn’t this mean that qua locutions just ascribe properties to parts 
and not to wholes? If that’s right, then it’s no wonder that there is no 
confl ict between “S qua N is P” and “S qua N* is not P,” since the subjects 
of att ribution turn out to be distinct. The real subjects are the parts not 
the wholes. However, both Left ow and Stump deny this, and claim that 
the whole can also be ascribed the properties of the parts. Yet Left ow and 
Stump diﬀ er in their accounts of how this is so. We’ll look fi rst at what 
Stump has to say before turning our att ention to Left ow.
Section VI.I: Stump on Property Borrowing
Stump claims that the idea that the CA ultimately ascribes properties to 
the parts, rather than to the whole is mistaken.
[T]his line of argument [i.e., that the reduplicative sentences ascribe 
properties only to parts and not to wholes] can’t be right. A thing 
[Stump has been discussing a molecule that has both coiled and Y-
shaped parts] which has a coiled part really is itself coiled in some 
respect or to some degree. Similarly, in virtue of having a part that 
is Y-shaped, the whole itself is really not coiled in that respect or 
to that degree. If a student seeing a diagram of the molecule for 
the fi rst time were to describe it to someone unfamiliar with its 
shape, she might well say, “Well, it’s a sort of complicated coiled, 
Y-shaped molecule.” So the incompatible properties of being coiled 
and not being coiled are att ributes of the whole molecule not just 
of diﬀ erent parts of the molecule. But because these are borrowed 
properties, since the molecule does not have these properties in its 
own right, there is no incoherence in the claims that the molecule is 
both coiled and uncoiled.17
Stump continues:
As long as qua locutions are understood in this way, it is clear that 
both qua locutions—”x as A is N” and “x as B is not N”—can be true 
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without any violation of the laws of logic. The two qua claims taken 
together do not have the result that we are making inconsistent claims 
or that we are giving a logically incoherent account of x. Although 
contradictory att ributes are being predicated of the same subject, they 
are not predicated in the same respect. [The molecule] C/EPB is coiled 
in virtue of having a constituent which is could in the alpha helix 
manner, and it is not coiled in virtue of having a constituent which is 
Y-shaped.18
It looks as though Stump is claiming that any property had by a part is 
had by its whole “in some respect or to some degree.” Surely if a mol-
ecule that is by no means genuinely coiled is counted as “coiled, in some 
respect” in virtue of having a part that is coiled, then it would seem that 
all properties had by parts are had, in some respect, by wholes. But either 
the degree to which the whole has these properties can be so small as to 
be insignifi cant or the view is just false. I have parts that are microscopic. 
But I’m not microscopic. I have parts that are transparent, boneless, and 
ameba-shaped, but I’m none of those things in any sense at all. Adopting 
the view that all properties had by parts are had “in some respect” by the 
whole is therefore a road best not taken if there are other options. And, as 
we shall see, there are.
Stump claims to take the idea that wholes “borrow” properties from 
component parts from the work of Lynne Rudder Baker.19 Yet on Baker’s 
account of borrowing, the whole neither borrows every property from 
every part nor borrows any property only in “some respect” or “to some 
degree.” Properties that are borrowed are “really” had by the whole. 
Here’s a quotation from Baker that Stump herself cites:
[I]f x borrows H from y, then x really has H—piggyback, so to speak 
. . . if I cut my hand, then I really bleed. . . . I borrow the property of 
bleeding from my body, but I really bleed.20
There is no indication in anything Baker says that the properties borrowed 
are had only in a qualifi ed way.21
The reason that I make a point of noting Stump’s misuse of Baker’s 
notion of borrowing is that Baker’s original notion just can’t do the work 
that Stump needs it to do. For on Baker’s account of borrowing, if x were 
to borrow H from y, and at the same time x were to borrow ~H from z, 
then x would really be H and ~H. So if JC borrows omnipotence from his 
divine part and non-omnipotence from his human part, then JC would 
really be omnipotent and non-omnipotent, and, like the poor, the logical 
problems would always be with us. In short, borrowing in Baker’s sense 
can be of no use to Stump unless it provides at least a measure of property 
insulation. If the whole only has the property of the part “to a degree” 
then the Stump’s view has at least some hope of being useful for solving 
incarnational troubles.
There are other problems with Stump’s account. We can see one of them 
by noting that her analysis of the qua move accomplishes what she wants 
it to accomplish only if the entailment from “qua A is N” to “N” is blocked; 
that is, only if the properties of the part are at least partially insulated 
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from the whole, so that the properties are borrowed but not had by the 
whole simpliciter. But for a great many borrowed properties, it appears 
that the entailment holds. As we’ve seen, that seems to be part and parcel 
of Baker’s idea of borrowing. I get a gash on my leg and blood is pouring 
out. My leg is bleeding. I’m bleeding. I am bleeding because I have a part 
that is bleeding. As explained above, Baker’s account of “borrowing” has 
it that I have this property in an unqualifi ed way. That is, it isn’t that since 
I am bleeding only because my leg is bleeding (and my leg is a part of me), 
I am only bleeding “in a respect.” No, I am just plain bleeding.
Notice this too: I have other parts that have the property of not bleed-
ing. Stump would have us say then, that qua my leg, I’m bleeding and 
qua my ear, say, I’m not. So I’m bleeding in some respect and not bleeding 
in others. But this is just wrong. Given the property that gets picked out 
by the English predicate “is bleeding” when applied to human persons, I 
am bleeding if I have a part that is bleeding externally. So even though I’ll 
have lots of parts that aren’t bleeding, I still satisfy the conditions neces-
sary and suﬃ  cient for having the property of bleeding if my leg is bleed-
ing. Similarly, I have parts that weigh more than twenty pounds. I borrow 
the property of weighing more than twenty pounds from them. But I have 
other parts that weigh less than an ounce. Is the sober truth of the matt er 
the same in both respects—in each case I borrow the property from the 
parts that have them, and that both are true in their respective respects? 
Surely not. Weighing more than twenty pounds trumps weighing less 
than an ounce where I’m concerned.
In order for her account to solve the logical diﬃ  culties in the incarna-
tion, Stump needs the respective kind-essential properties of divinity and 
humanity to be had primarily by parts of the composite whole, and for the 
whole to borrow the properties enough so that there is a sense in which the 
composite has the properties but not to such a degree that there is prob-
lem with consistency. That is, borrowing (or an approximation thereof) is 
needed so that there remains a single object of predication in the incarna-
tion and yet property insulation is required to avoid incompatible att ribu-
tions. The trouble is that if the properties are borrowed in the way that 
Baker has in mind, then the composite simply has those properties, and no 
ground against the logical problems is gained. So Stump has the compos-
ite borrowing the properties “in a respect,” hoping to split the diﬀ erence 
between honest-to-goodness borrowing and the insulation of the proper-
ties of the parts from the properties of the whole. But this implies that all 
borrowed properties are had only “in a respect” and that is not the case.
Section VI.II: Left ow on Property Borrowing
Left ow considers explicitly the question of why “S qua N is P” doesn’t 
entail that “S is P,” and hence that the qua move does nothing to help with 
the apparent logical problems faced by the doctrine of the Incarnation.
The answer, on a mereological reading of Christology’s ‘qua’, is that 
there is no entailment here because sometimes the att ributes of one 
part become the att ributes of the whole, and sometimes the att ri-
butes of another part do: the apple as a whole is nutritious because 
of some of its parts, though the rest are not nutritious, and the apple 
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as a whole is red due to other of its parts, though the rest is not red. 
So the att ributes of the apple’s non-red and non-nutritious parts do 
not become att ributes of the whole, and there is just no uniform rule 
by which to fi gure out which part’s att ributes will come to qualify its 
whole. Thus, christologists and students of apples must work things 
out case by case. The Son is omnipotent. S + B [the soul and body of 
JC] is not. Here, probably, the whole counts as omnipotent. But di-
vine att ributes do not always become att ributes of the whole: again, 
the whole Jesus Christ is created [because JC is a composite that in-
cludes the created parts of the human body and soul].22
So Left ow also maintains that wholes sometimes borrow properties from 
their parts. But he diﬀ ers with Stump in two related ways. First, he thinks 
that not all properties of parts become properties of their respective 
wholes; and second, he thinks that, at least in most cases, when wholes 
do borrow, they simply have the properties they borrow—and don’t have 
them only in a respect.23 The apple is red because the skin is red; it isn’t 
merely “red to a degree.” Left ow’s view is stronger for diﬀ ering with 
Stump in these regards. Yet while Left ow’s position is more tenable than 
Stump’s, its general tenability is no guarantee that it will be successful in 
solving the logical diﬃ  culties it is supposed to solve. Indeed, I think we 
can see that it will not.
Left ow says “there is just no uniform rule by which to fi gure out which 
part’s att ributes will come to qualify its whole.” He gives two Christo-
logical instances where the whole does borrow properties from the divine 
part: JC is created (this is borrowed from JC’s humanity) and omnipotent 
(borrowed from his divinity). As for the other potentially problematic 
property pairs, they will need to be worked out “case by case.”
To say that these property pairs will have to be worked out one at a 
time is to say that the qua move does not, in fact, give us any general help 
in resolving the logical diﬃ  culties of the incarnation. For any pair of logi-
cally complementary properties that we are tempted to att ribute to JC in 
virtue of his dual nature, the defender of the qua move will insist that one 
member of the pair is had qua divinity and the other qua humanity. That 
much needn’t be worked out case by case. But whether JC borrows the 
particular divine property or the particular human property will not be 
resolved by use of reduplicative sentences. Yet this is precisely where we 
need help and where the qua move was supposed to be useful.
Now Left ow does say something suggestive that might be seen as a de-
fense from this charge. Before ruling that the composite Christ is created, 
Left ow considers an advantage of the CA over views that see the incarna-
tion as involving the taking on of abstract natures (i.e., sets of properties) 
rather than the literal taking on of parts. Left ow writes:
The property of being created does seem to be the sort of metaphysi-
cal property individuals have simpliciter, rather than only in virtue 
of having other properties. This is a reasonable cavil with a reading 
of (H’) [i.e., “Christ as God is uncreated but as a man is a created be-
ing”] as involving abstract natures, i.e., taking ‘as God’ to indicate not 
a part but a property in virtue of which Christ has a property. But it 
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fails absolutely against a mereological reading. . . . On such a reading, 
(H’) tells us that Christ has one part which is created and one which 
is uncreated. Each part has this property simpliciter, not in virtue of 
other properties. And again, no contradiction emerges here. We do 
not have to say that Christ is both created and uncreated. The worst 
we might have to sett le for is a claim that Christ has a created part 
and an uncreated part, and neither ‘created’ nor ‘uncreated’ applies 
simpliciter to a whole consisting of such parts. (Consider a sphere 
whose surface is half-white, half-black: it has a white part and a black 
part, and neither ‘white’ nor ‘black’ applies to it as a whole, for the way 
we use colour-words requires [something like] that a thing be called 
[say] black only if the majority of its surface is black.)24
So Left ow might claim that the qua move, understood in the mereological 
way, helps for all cases of apparent logical incompatibility in the incarna-
tion. For these problems will be resolved in one of two ways: either by our 
coming to see that although the composite JC has property P, JC’s being P 
is borrowed from one part’s being P, while there is another part that is not P 
(this is what happens in the case of omnipotence, say). Or the problem will 
be resolved by our coming to see that although JC has a part that is P and 
another part that is not P, JC is neither P simpliciter nor not P simpliciter. In 
either case, it is the mereological understanding of reduplicative sentences 
that allows us to see the solution.
Although initially tempting, I think the above resolution should be resist-
ed. For the qua move will only provide a general (if two-pronged) solution 
to these Leibniz’s Law problems if we can abide talk of JC’s failing to have 
simpliciter either a property of divinity or its logical complement. But such 
talk runs afoul of a pair of principles we should accept. Let me explain.
As every student of deductive reasoning knows, two fundamental 
principles of logic are The Law of Noncontradiction (LN) and The Law 
of the Excluded Middle (LEM): no proposition is true and false, and ev-
ery proposition is either true or false. And as every teacher of basic logic 
knows, both these principles can seem, on fi rst blush, to admit of counter-
examples. When a fi ne mist fi lls the air on a dreary day, it can seem fi tt ing 
to say “it is raining and it is not raining.” If this is indeed true, then the LN 
is apparently false. Or the other hand, if on such a day you are asked, “Is 
it raining or not?” you might be inclined to think “neither” is the accurate 
answer. And if that is right, then it seems the LEM can’t be true.
These apparent counterexamples are, however, merely apparent. For they 
trade on an ambiguity in “is raining.” On the one hand, “it is raining” can 
mean that there is some form of non-frozen precipitation in the air; on the 
other hand, it can mean that there are discrete drops falling from the sky. So 
the reason “It is raining and it is not raining” can be used to say something 
true is that it can be used to say “There is non-frozen precipitation in the air 
and there are no discrete drops of rain falling from the sky.” Similarly, “It is 
raining” might seem to lack a truth value because it is ambiguous, and until 
it is disambiguated, it simply fails to assert anything.
The LN and the LEM can plausibly be thought to have the following cor-
ollaries regarding properties. The Law of Noncontradiction for Properties 
(LNP): No object can have a property and its logical complement; and the 
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Law of the Excluded Middle for Properties (LEMP): For every object O and 
for every property P, either O exemplifi es P or O does not exemplify P.
It is the LNP that the doctrine of the incarnation is in danger of violat-
ing when it ascribes to JC the properties of divinity and the properties of 
humanity. We’ve seen that Left ow would resolve some of these potential 
problems by claiming that the whole borrows some, but not all, proper-
ties from its parts. So JC can borrow the property of being created from 
JC’s human part and omnipotence from JC’s divine part. JC is then created 
and omnipotent, and (in keeping with the LNP) JC fails to have the logical 
complements of those properties. So far, so good.
But Left ow also wants to say that in certain cases the properties will not 
be had simpliciter by the whole. Of course, he’s not saying that they should 
be understood to be lacked simpliciter by the whole either. The point of the 
black and white sphere example is that the property of being black, say, 
doesn’t apply to it simpliciter although it does apply to some degree. At 
least in this kind of case, the sphere’s having a part that is black suﬃ  ces 
for the sphere’s being sort of black. Or as Left ow suggests at one point with 
respect to JC, we might just have to say that JC has a created part and an 
uncreated part and that “neither ‘created’ nor ‘uncreated’ applies simplic-
iter to a whole consisting of such parts.” But this claim confuses predicates 
and properties. While it might be true that neither the English word ‘cre-
ated’ nor the English word ‘uncreated’ applies in an unqualifi ed way to 
JC, that is irrelevant to the primary concern. For the properties of God 
Incarnate are what is of interest. To see this, recall the half white, half black 
ball. Again, the way English color words are used, we can’t unequivocally 
say that the ball is ‘white’ or that it is ‘black.’ But that doesn’t mean the ball 
has some property that is indeterminate. Once we clarify what property we 
mean to be picking out when we call the ball ‘black,’ then either the ball 
will have or lack that property simpliciter. For instance, one might think 
that to have the property of “being black” an object must be black over 90 
percent or more of its visible area. If this is the right account of the prop-
erty of “being black,” then every object will have or will lack that property 
simpliciter. In short, the vagueness that Left ow is noting is in our language 
and not in the world of objects.
Let’s consider, then, how this applies to the incarnation. Because JC 
is divine, there is reason to ascribe omniscience to JC; but because JC is 
human, there is reason to think JC’s knowledge must be limited, and that 
JC is hence not omniscient. Might we content ourselves (and our logi-
cal scruples) by sett ling for this as the rock-bott om truth: JC has a part 
that is omniscient and JC has a part that is limited in knowledge, and 
that’s eﬀ ectively the end of the story? That the best we can do is say that 
JC is neither omniscient simpliciter nor limited in knowledge simpliciter, 
although he is sort of both? No, we’d bett er not content ourselves with 
this unless we are prepared to give up the LEMP. If we manage to pick 
out a well-defi ned property with our term ‘omniscience,’ and if JC is a 
unifi ed entity (that is, if there is a single subject of predication), then JC 
will either satisfy the conditions for being omniscient or he won’t. If JC 
does then JC is omniscient simpliciter and if JC does not then JC lacks the 
property of omniscience.
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One might think that if there are two minds in God incarnate, one om-
niscient and one not, then JC would not be omniscient (or not) simpliciter, 
but only omniscient-in-a-respect and not-omniscient-in-a-respect. But 
this would be a mistake. To see why, consider a composite physical object 
that has a part that weighs in excess of ten pounds and another part that 
weighs less than ten pounds. Even if it is correct to say that the object is 
in excess of ten pounds in a respect and less than ten pounds in a respect 
(in virtue of the composite’s having parts that are such), it also true to say 
that the object is in excess of ten pounds simpliciter. In the same way, if JC 
has a mind that is omniscient and another mind that isn’t, the composite 
JC adopts the “stronger” of the two properties since if JC has a mind that 
is omniscient there is nothing that JC doesn’t know.
I conclude, then, that the qua move, even understood in light of the CA, 
can’t be used to show how to get around the logical diﬃ  culties faced by the 
doctrine of the incarnation. For wholes sometimes do, and sometimes do 
not, borrow properties from parts. When they do, the wholes really have 
those properties and so a whole can’t borrow a property and its logical com-
plement from a pair of its parts. So no ground is gained for the coherence 
of the incarnation by appealing to the properties of JC’s parts. On the other 
hand, when a whole doesn’t genuinely borrow a property from a part, we 
can’t truly ascribe the property to the whole in a less than simpliciter way. 
While failing to pay proper att ention to the distinction between predicates 
and properties might make this seem initially possible, once the distinction 
is noted and the LEMP recognized, we see that even this last stand for the 
CA-inspired qua move breaks down.
Section VII: Conclusion
In this paper I’ve argued that the compositional view of the incarnation is 
fraught with both philosophical and theological problems. Furthermore, 
even if this weren’t so, the compositional view does nothing to help the 
traditional conception of the incarnation get around the logical diﬃ  culties 
thought to beset it.25
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1. Brian Left ow, “A Timeless God Incarnate” and Eleonore Stump, “Aqui-
nas’ Metaphysics of the Incarnation.” Both papers appear in The Incarnation: 
An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen T. 
Davis, Daniel Kendall, SJ, and Gerald O’Collins, SJ (Oxford University Press, 
2002). Stump’s paper is taken from material from chapters 1 and 14 of her 
book Aquinas (Routledge Press, 2003). References to Stump are to her article 
in the Davis, et al., volume. Although Stump’s book contains more material 
about both the details of Aquinas’s metaphysics as it relates to the Incarnation 
and how to understand the claim that a single person could have a duality of 
intellect and of will as required by the traditional doctrine, I believe that the 
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2. Objections of this type are sometimes called “Leibniz’s Law” problems 
since the doctrine seems to imply that Jesus Christ would not have every prop-
erty that the Second Person of the Trinity has, and vice versa. But since Jesus 
Christ is supposed to be identical to the Second Person, this would involve a 
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